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UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE-
A PROSPECT FOR CONSUMER CREDIT
REFORM IN VIRGINIA
DAVID F. PETERS*
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code' [hereinafter referred to as
the UCCC] is currently being considered by legislative study commit-
tees2 and various interested groups for possible submission to the
1972 Session of the Virginia General Assembly. Virginia's interest in
the UCCC joins that of at least twenty-one other states3 that have
studied the Code in the last two years. So far, only Oklahoma 4 and
Utah5 have enacted the UCCC into law, but the gradual success of
the Uniform Commercial Code" serves as a reminder not to dismiss the
UCCC summarily because of its slow beginnings.
The UCCC was prepared by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, the same body that produced the Uni-
form Commercial Code and many of the other uniform statutes that
have gained general acceptance. 7 A special committee of the National
Conference began its work on the Code in 1963,8 and following com-
*Associate, Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, Virginia; B.A.
1963, Washington and Lee University; LL.B. 1966, Duke University.
'Uniform Consumer Credit Code (Revised Final Draft, Feb. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as UCCCJ.
2At the 197o Session of the Virginia legislature, two separate studies of the
UCCC were authorized. H.J.R. io6 directed the Virginia Code Commission to study
the Code during the 1970-1972 interim, and S.J.R. 41 created a special Consumer
Credit Study Commission to examine consumer credit problems in general, with
specific attention to the UCCC. An additional study by the Virginia Advisory
Legislative Council was proposed by H.J.R. 52 and S.J.R. 23, but each of these
measures died in committee. I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 4771 (Feb. 4, 1971).
31 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 4771 (Feb. 4, 1971)-
'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969).
'"UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7oB-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969).
6The original version of the Uniform Commercial Code was first adopted in
Pennsylvania in 1953. The next state to enact the law, Massachusetts, waited until
1957. By 1963, when Virginia seriously studied the UCC for adoption, 29 states had
enacted it. VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, TIME TO ADOPT THE UNIFOR.
COMMERCIAL CODE 3-4, 597 (1963). Today, the UCC is law in 49 states, Louisiana
being the only exception. i CCH SEC. TRANS. GUIDE 650 (May 7, 1969)-
'Some of the uniform laws enacted in Virginia include: Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-364.3 to -364.11 (Supp. 1970); Uniform Partnership
Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43 (Repl. Vol. 1967); Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.12 to -88.31 (Repl. Vol. 196o); Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-401 to -423 (Repl. Vol. 1964) (repealed
1966).
"Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43
Tr iP. L. Q. 313, 314 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Braucher].
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pletion of a final ninth draft in 1968, the American Bar Association
endorsed the UCCC for adoption by the states.9 A revised final draft
was issued in early 1969, and it is this draft that is being considered
for adoption in Virginia.
A great deal has been written recently about the Code, both favor-
able and critical,10 particularly with reference to some of its more
controversial features such as maximum interest ceilings" and the
"free entry" concept of licensing.' 2 Rather than take sides on any of
these issues, however, this article will examine the principal effects
adoption of the Code will have on existing Virginia law and con-
sumer credit practices in the State. It is hoped that such an analysis
will provide an objective perspective for assessing the particular signi-
ficance of the UCCG for Virginia.
SCOPE OF THE UCCC
The UCCC would affect practically every aspect of consumer cred-
it, including disclosures of credit terms and advertising, rates of in-
terest and finance charges, consumers' and creditors' rights and reme-
dies, the regulation of particular credit practices, and the licensing of
lending institutions.
As a basic matter, consumer credit under the UCCC would con-
sist of all personal credit used for consumer purposes. To qualify, such
credit would have to meet each of the following tests: (a) the credit must
be extended by a seller or lender regularly engaged in credit transac-
tions; (b) the debtor must be an individual, as distinguished from an
organization such as a corporation, partnership, trust or estate; (c) the
sale or loan must be made for a personal, family, household or agri-
cultural purpose, rather than a business purpose; (d) a charge must
be made for the credit (that is, interest or a finance charge) or the debt
'93 A.B.A. REPORTS 361-62 (1968).
I'See generally Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-the Usury Headache,
19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 819 (1968); Braucher, supra note 8; Fritz, Would the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus. LAw. 511 (970); Harper, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus. LAw. 227 (1968);
Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387
(1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968); Malcolm, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25
Bus. LAw. 937 (97o); Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957 (1970);
Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's View, 54 CoRNELL L.
REv. 491 (1969); Symposium-Consumer Credit Reform, 33 LAw & CONTNMP. PROn.
639 (1968); Symposium-Toward a Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 J. FINANcr
33 (1968).
"1See text accompanying notes 97-105 infra.
2-"See text accompanying notes 12o-123 infra.
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is repayable in installments; and (e) the amount of the credit may not
exceed $25,ooo except where the credit is secured by an interest in
land.'
3
While these tests serve to limit the principal thrust of the Code to
consumer credit, certain other forms of credit transactions would be
affected as well. For example, the UCCC would regulate certain trans-
actions which do not meet all of the technical standards for con-
sumer credit, but which are termed "consumer related" transactions
under the Code. Such a consumer related transaction is a sale or loan in
which the amount of the credit extended does not exceed $25,ooo, and
either (i) the debtor is an individual, or (ii) the debtor is an organiza-
tion and the debt is secured by a one or two family dwelling occupied
by a person "related"14 to the debtor.15 Accordingly, a bank loan of
$io,ooo to a corporation would not qualify as a pure consumer loan
because the debtor would not be an individual and the loan would
probably be used for a business purpose rather than for a personal,
family, household, or agricultural purpose. But if the loan were to be
secured by a deed of trust on the corporation president's family resi-
dence, then the loan would be considered "consumer related" under
the Code. Such consumer related transactions would be subject to
specific rate ceilings under the UCCC but not the disclosure provi-
sions.16
Even transactions which are neither pure consumer credit sales or
loans nor consumer related would be affected to a limited extent by
adoption of the Code. That is, by establishing maximum finance charge
ceilings for consumer credit and consumer related transactions, the
UCCC would also repeal any existing ceilings for other types of credit
transactions.'7 Accordingly, a loan to an individual in excess of $25,ooo,
which might be subject to an eight per cent annual interest limitation
under present Virginia law,'8 would be free from any interest ceilings
under the UCCC.
3UCCC §§ 2.104, 3.104.
"The UCCC does not explain what is meant by a person "related" to the debtor
organization, but presumably this reference contemplates, for example, an officer,
director, stockholder or even an employee of a corporation.
15UCCC §§ 2.602, 3.602.
°UCCC § 2.602, Comment 2; § 3.602, Comment 2; see notes 93 and 95 infra.
In addition, consumer related transactions would be subject to UCCC provisions
dealing with additional charges and delinquency charges, refinancing and con-
solidation, and advances to perform covenants of the debtor. UCCC § 2.602, Com-
ment 2; § 3.602, Comment 2.
'7UCCC §§ 2.605, 3.605.
2WA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (Supp. 1970).
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In short, the UCCC would affect in one way or another virtually
every type of business establishment which extends credit-for ex-
ample, banks, small loan companies, savings and loan associations, cred-
it unions, insurance premium finance companies, and retail mer-
chants.1 For purposes of the remaining discussion, the provisions of
the UCCC as they relate to these types of creditors will be considered
in terms of the following subject matters: (I) disclosures, (2) rates, (3)
licensing, and (4) consumer protections.
DISCLOSURES
The disclosure provisions of the UCCC are largely in response to
Title I of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, the title also
known as the Federal Truth in Lending Act,20 which became effective
nationwide on July 1, 1969. This federal statute and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation Z21 which implements it, preempt all state
laws except those which are deemed by the Federal Reserve Board to be
"substantially similar" to the federal requirements and entitled to
exemption. 22 The Federal Truth in Lending Act is thus the governing
law on credit disclosures in most states, including Virginia, as only a
few exemptions have been granted thus far.
23
The UCCC has been designed to meet the "substantially similar"
test for exemption from the Federal Truth in Lending Act.24 That is,
the UCCC requires complete disclosure of the same information and in
the same manner as required by the Federal Act, and presumably the
"'The Code expressly excludes from its coverage (i) extensions of credit to
government, governmental agencies and instrumentalities, (ii) the sale of insurance
by an insurer, except credit life, accident and health insurance, and property and
liability insurance written in connection with a credit transaction, (iii) the sale
of regulated public utility and common carrier services, and (iv) disclosures and
rates of licensed pawnbrokers. UCCC § 1.202.
mConsumer Credit Protection Act, Tide I, 82 Stat. 146 §§ 1o-45 (codified as
15 US.C.A. §§ 16o1-18, 1631-41, 1661-65 (Supp. 197o)) [hereinafter cited as CCPA
Title I].
2'Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 to .12 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Reg. Z].
nCCPA Title I § 123, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1633 (Supp. 1970).
21To date, Maine, Oklahoma, Massachusetts and Connecticut have received
exemptions. I CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE 3680-83 (Dec. 1o, 1970).
O'Oklahoma, which has adopted the UCCC, was granted an exemption from the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, effective June 1, 1970. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE 3681 (Aug. 5, 1970)-
Like the federal law, the basic aim of the UCCC disclosure sections is to permit
"informed judgments" as to the use of credit and to facilitate "shopping for credit."
UCCC Prefatory Note in CCH, NEw RULES oN CONSUMER CREUrr PROTEfrION 267
(1969).
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regulations to be adopted under the Code25 would be identical in all
material respects to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z. Accord-
ingly, Virginia creditors whose billing procedures and forms are now
in compliance with the federal law would experience no change in re-
quired disclosures with adoption of the UCCC. One important effect,
however, would be to localize and consolidate the enforcement duties
for the law, now the responsibility of nine separate federal agencies in
those states not exempt from the Federal Act,26 into a single state
agency.
Virginia already has a comprehensive credit disclosure law27 which
is also quite similar to the Federal Truth in Lending Act. This law,
known as the Virginia Consumer Credit Code,28 was patterned by the
1968 General Assembly after the truth in lending bill 29 then pending in
Congress. The State Corporation Commission has prescribed regula-
tions30 for use under this Virginia law which track almost exactly the
format and terminology used in the Federal Reserve Board's Regula-
tion Z. Virginia filed a formal application for exemption from the Fed-
eral Act in 1969,31 but has subsequently withdrawn its application.
32
For the most part, the disclosure provisions of the UCCC, the Vir-
ginia Consumer Credit Code and the Federal Truth in Lending Act
are parallel. There are certain differences between the Virginia law
and the Federal Act, however, which might explain Virginia's with-
drawal of its application for exemption. Adoption of the UCCC, on the
other hand, would appear to eliminate these deficiencies.3 3 For example,
mSee UCCC Prefatory Note in CCH, NEw RULEs ON CONSUMER CRDrr PROTECT=
ION 266 (1969); UCCC § 6.1o4 (2).
"CCPA Title I § 1O8, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (Supp. 1970).
-'A. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-352 to -360 (Supp. 1970).
*VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-352 (Supp. 1970).
'S. 5, goth Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
O°S.C.C. Order, Case No. 18621, 1969 REP. STATE Coi'. COAIss'N -.
"3 CCH CONSUMER Cpxmrr GUIDE, Latest Report Letter No. 2o, at 1 (Oct. 30,
1969). In view of the present preemption of the subject by federal law, the State
Corporation Commission exercised its statutory authority, VA. CODE ANN. §
6.1-359 (Supp. 1970), to suspend effectiveness of the Virginia Consumer Credit Code
until such time as the State may be granted an exemption. S.C.C. Order, Case
No. 18621, 1969 REP. STATE CORP. CoasasN at -.
23 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUiDE, Latest Report Letter No. 53, at 5 (Dec.
22, 1970).
33Utah, one of the two UCCC states, has also withdrawn its application for
exemption from the Federal Act apparently because of differences between its
version of the UCCC and the federal law. Id. Oklahoma, on the other hand, the
other UCCC state, has received an exemption. Note 24 supra. Accordingly, adoption
of the UCCC does not guarantee exemption from the federal law, but presumably
a version of the UCCC which corrects the Virginia deficiencies, text accompanying
notes 34-48 infra, would be sufficient.
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on certain consumer credit transactions involving security interests in
residential real estate, the Federal Act provides the debtor a three day
right to rescind the contract, and requires the creditor to use a specified
form in disclosing that right to the debtor.34 There is no comparable
measure under Virginia law,3 5 whereas the UCCC prescribes a right of
rescission identical to that of the Federal Act.
36
In addition, the penalties for violation of the Virginia Consumer
Credit Code are not as severe as those under the Federal Truth in
Lending Act, the Virginia law prescribing a maximum fine of $1,00
37
as against a maximum fine of $5,000 under the Federal Act.38 The
UCCC penalty section contains a blank for the maximum fine;30 ac-
cordingly, if a $5,000 maximum fine is necessary for an exemption,
40
the legislature could specify that amount in enacting the UCCC.
The Virginia and federal statutes and the UCCC differ as to the
exclusion of broker-dealers from coverage. A broker-dealer registered
with the State Corporation Commission is excluded under the Virginia
Consumer Credit Code,41 whereas only broker-dealers registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission are excluded from the
Federal Act.4 Broker-dealers would not be excluded from the UCCC,
however, regardless of whether registered with the S.C.C. or the S.E.C.
To this extent, then, the UCCC would be more restrictive than the
Federal Act.
On the other hand, the UCCC would exclude licensed pawnbrokers
from disclosure requirements, 4 3 whereas neither the Virginia law nor
3'CCPA Title I § 125, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635 (Supp. 197o); Reg. Z § 226.10.
-The Virginia Home Solicitation Sales Act, VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 59.1-21.1 tO
-21.6 (Supp. 1970), provides a three day right of rescission as to certain sales per-
sonally solicited and consummated in the buyer's home. Text accompanying notes
IP7 and 172 infra. Its application, however, is limited to sales solicited in the home.
The federal right of rescission, on the other hand, applies to both sales and loans
secured by residential real estate, regardless of where solicited or consummated.
"UCCC § 5.204. The UCCC also allows rescission within three days of home
solicited sales. UCCC § 2.502; text accompanying notes 169 and 170 infra. It further
allows an unlimited right to rescind a referral sale. UCCC § 241i; text accompanying
note 167 infra.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-357(b) (Supp. 1970).
CG-PA Title I § 112, 15 U.S.CA. § x611 (Supp. 1970).
3UCCC § 5.301.
40Such a fine would be considerably greater than the maximum fine of $iooo
for misdemeanors in Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18a-9 (Supp. 1970) .
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-358(2) (Supp. 197o); S.C.C. Reg. 3 (d).
'CCPA Title I § 104(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 16o3(2) (Supp. 197o); Reg. Z § 226.3(b).
43UCCC § 1.202(4). It has been suggested that the regulation of pawnbrokers is
a police function, and is only remotely related to the consumer credit issue. Moo,
Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957, 970 (1970).
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the Federal Act exclude such creditors. Accordingly, even with enact-
ment of a Virginia UCCC and its ultimate exemption from federal
law, Virginia pawnbrokers would remain subject to the Federal Truth
in Lending Act.
44
The Federal Act covers not only actual creditors, but also persons
who "arrange" for the extension of credit.49 The Virginia definition of
"creditor", however, contains no reference to persons who arrange for
credit. 46 The final draft of the UCCC also referred only to actual cred-
itors, but a 197o amendment to the Code suggested by its drafters would
include as a creditor "a person who in the ordinary course of business
regularly extends or arranges for the extension of credit."47
Finally, the State Corporation Commission regulations fail to re-
quire the disclosure of the method for determining the amount of the
finance charge on open-end (revolving) charge accounts as does Regula-
tion Z.48 A new UCCC regulation could be made identical to the fed-
eral rule on this matter, but presumably the existing Virginia regula-
tion could be amended where necessary by the State Corporation Com-
mission and retained under the UCCC.
RATES
In the area of rate of finance charge, the UCCC would bring bold
changes to the present Virginia scheme for regulation of rates. As with
legislation in most other states, 49 the Virginia statutes specify a basic
usury rateG0 and numerous special exception rates for particular types
of creditors and transactions. In addition, there are differences within
the statutes as to the proper method for computing the rate-that is,
whether the charge is to be applied periodically at a simple rate
"UCCC § 1.202(4), Comment.
"COPA Title I § 103(), 15 U.S.C.A. § 16o2(f) (Supp. 197o); Reg. Z § 226.2(m).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-353(e) (Supp. 1970). State Corporation Commission
Regulation 2(k) does define "creditor" as including an "arranger", and it would
seem that this would be sufficient for compliance with Federal Act. In analogous
fashion, Regulation Z goes beyond the federal statute by covering all consumer
transactions payable in more than four installments, regardless of whether a finance
charge is imposed. Reg. Z § 226.2(k). The federal statute is limited to transactions
involving finance charges. CCPA Title I § io3 (f), 15 U.S.CA. § 16o2(f) (Supp. 1970).
17 UCCC § 5.203, as amended, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GumE 5333 (Aug. 21,
1970) (emphasis added). Other differences between the UCCC and the Federal Act,
relating to the disclosures of real estate closing costs, have been resolved by
197o amendments to the Code. 3 CCII CONSUMER CmT GUIDE, Latest Report Letter
No. 44, at 5-6 (Aug. 21, 1970).
"Compare S.C.C. Reg. 7(a) with Reg. Z § 226.7(a).
"'Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 819, 835 (1968).
CVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (Supp. 1970) (8% per annum).
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against a declining unpaid balance (actuarial method); whether the
total charge is to be computed at the outset and added to the face
amount of the obligation ("add-on"); or whether the charge is to be
computed at the outset and retained by the creditor out of the loan
proceeds ("discount").5 1 The picture is further complicated by the
authorization of special additional charges, or points, on certain trans-
actions but not on others. The result is a complex patchwork of rate
statutes that presents a formidable task to anyone attempting to under-
stand Virginia's interest laws.
52
The following table, which lists the authorized rates, the prescribed
methods for computation and any additional charges that may be
made, illustrates the degree to which Virginia's interest rate laws have
been segmented according to type of creditor and transaction.
Creditor
or Rate Computation Additional
Transaction Method Charges
General 8% per annums Not specified
(Contract) (assumed to be
actuarial method)
Open-end "A% per month Apply monthly
(both retail and with free period rate to maximum
bank plans) of 25 days" fiscal monthly
balances
i% per month $0.25 per extension
where no free of credit, where
period" only i% monthly
charge made"
Banks:
Short term notes 1/% per 3o daysm Discount" 2% "investigation
fee" on bank loans
of Sooo or less6"
Installment Loans 6% per annum" Add-on"
5ln most cases of consumer credit, the actual yield is almost double the stated
rate when computed by either the "discount" or "add-on" methods. Malcolm, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. LAw. 937, 946 (1970).
r2For a discussion of these laws, see Shanks, Practical Problems in the Applica-
tion of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. RFv. 327 (1967).
6VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (Supp. 1970).
5VA. CODE ANN. § 6.-362 (Supp. 1970).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
'VA. CoDE ANN. § 6.1-32o (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"8The statute provides that a bank may "receive" interest in advance on short
term notes, and "charge" interest in advance on installment loans. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1966). The distinction between "receive" and "charge" was
interpreted in a 1957 decision by the Richmond Hustings Court, Part II, in
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Savings & Loan
Associations













Credit Unions I% per month" Actuarial method
Industrial Loan 7% per annum6 Add-on 2% "investigation
Associations fee"' '
Small Loan 2/% per month Actuarial method7'




Insurance Premium / of i% per Add-on =  $o "service
Finance Companies 3o days 72 charge'IT
Insurance Agents I% per month75 Not specified
(fire, casualty,
surety or marine)
First Mortgage No limit 6
Loans
Second Mortgage 7% per annum7  Add-on7'  2% "investigation
Loans fee ' "
FHA and VA loans No limit
Loans to corpora- Usury no defense
tions, partnerships. on loans otherwise
professional as- subject to § 6.1-319
sociations and real (general contract
estate investment rate) or § 6.1-32o
trusts (bank rate)8u
Richards v. White (Doubles, J.) (dictum), as authorizing the computation of in-
terest by discount for short term notes, and by add-on for installment loans.
VIRGINIA BAR Novs, April 1957, at 6-8. In practice, however, many banks continue
to discount interest on installment paper, apparently with the blessing of the
State Corporation Commission.
GVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
°Note 58 supra.
61VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-321 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
n2VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (Supp. 1970).
6VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-143 (RepI. Vol. 1966).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-143 (RepI. Vol. 1966).
EVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-215 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
6VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-215 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
6WA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-234.1 (Supp. 1970). The 7% rate is a temporary increase
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Virginia law also authorizes the collection of 2V,% "supervision and
inspection" fees on real estate construction loans, and 1i, "processing
and investigation" fees in connection with the permanent financing for
real estate, regardless of the type of lender.8 2 In addition, lenders prin-
cipally engaged in the business of making real estate mortgage loans for
resale may charge an "initial service, investigation or processing fee" of
1%. 8 35
By contrast, the UCCC would establish maximum rate ceilings that
would cut across the melange of type-creditor distinctions found in
existing Virginia law, and would vary only according to whether the
credit transaction is an installment sale, pursuant to a revolving charge
over the basic 6% rate. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-234 (Siupp. 1970). The 7% rate will
expire on July 1, 1972, unless directed otherwise by the General Assembly. VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-234.1 (Supp. 1970).
EVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-234 (Supp. 1970).
OVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-234 (Supp. 1970).
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-271(1) (Supp. 1970).
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-277 (Supp. 1970). As an alternative, small loan companies
are authorized to use add-on rates in terms of dollars per one hundred dollars per
year, the maximum permissible charges being $17 per $ioo on the first $300 of
balance and $12 per $ioo on the remaining balance up to $x,ooo. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-271(2) (Supp. 197). Either method will apparently produce the same yield.
VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGIsLATIvE COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA SMALL LOAN ACT,
S. Doc. No. 12, at io (1967).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-740 (Rep1. Vol. 1970). This statutory ceiling may not be
charged by insurance premium finance companies until authorized by the State
Corporation Commission. At present, the S.C.C. rate is 1/2 of I% per 3o days, which
was the statutory ceiling prior to the 197o amendment.
WA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-740 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
''VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-740 (Rep1. Vol. 1970).
WVA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-293.1 (RepI. Vol. 1970).
70A. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319.1 (Supp. 197o), enacted as an emergency measure by
the 197o legislature, removed interest ceilings on loans secured by first deeds of
trust on real estate which would otherwise be subject to § 6.1-318 (the "legal" rate
of 6%), § 6.-3i9 (the general "contract" rate of 8%), or § 6.1-32o (the bank rate).
The relief provision will expire on July 1, 1972.
77VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-33o(a), -234.1 (Supp. 1970). Unless continued by the next
General Assembly, this rate will be reduced to 6% per annum on July 1, 1972. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330(a), -234 (Supp. 1970).
WA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-33o(a), -234 (Supp. 1970).
WA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-33o(b), -234 (Supp. 1970).
8°VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-328 (Supp. 197o).
81VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-327 (Supp. 1970).
WA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-324 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
83VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-323 (Repl. Vol. 1966). To collect this fee, the loan must
have a maturity date of io years or more. This fee cannot be collected in addition
to the "supervision and inspection" or "processing and investigation" fees authorized
on real estate loans. Text accompanying note 82 supra.
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account, or one of two types of loans. The Code would thus prescribe
ceilings having uniform application to all the various types of credit
institutions, without regard to whether such institutions are banks,
savings and loan associations, credit unions, or otherwise.
In addition, the UCCC ceilings would be based upon the actuarial
method of computation,8 4 thus eliminating the present confusion un-
der Virginia law as to whether a particular statutory rate is intended
as a discount or an add-on rate.8 5
Further, the UCCC would require that the ceilings be applied to
the total of all charges incident to the extension of credit (points,
investigation fees, processing fees), not just the interest,8 6 and would
establish uniformity as to any additional charges that may be made.8 7
In prescribing rate ceilings for loans, the UCCC distinguishes be-
tween two types of loans: those that are "supervised" loans, and those
that are not. A "supervised" loan is any consumer loan with a finance
charge rate in excess of 18% per annum.8 8 The authority8 9 to make
"supervised" loans is limited to lenders specially licensed for such pur-
pose under the UCCC,90 and to "supervised financial organizations", de-
fined as institutions which are authorized both to make loans and re-
ceive deposits, and which are subject to supervision by a federal or
state agency. 91 Loans with rate charges of 18%o or less would not be
"supervised".
The UCCC rate ceilings for "supervised" loans would be the
greater of (i) the total of 36% per year on unpaid balances of $3oo or
'UCCC §§ 2.201(2), 3.20(l), 3.508.
16Note 58 supra.
'UCCC §§ 2.109, 3.109.
"'Such additional charges include official fees (recording fees) and taxes;
premiums for property and liability insurance where the source of such insurance
is optional with the debtor; premiums for credit life, accident or health insurance
where such insurance is not required; annual charges for the privilege of using
certain lender credit cards; and reasonable closing costs on transactions involving
real estate. UCCC §§ 2.202, 3.202, as amended, i CCH CONSUMER CaaDri GUIDE
5062, 5182 (Aug. 21, 197o). The UCCC also authorizes "delinquency charges" of the
greater of 5% of the unpaid installment or the amount of a "deferral charge"




'OUCCC § 3.503; text accompanying notes iog and 12 infra.
9UCCC § 1.301(17). Banks, savings and loan associations, industrial loan associa-
tions and credit unions would be "supervised financial organizations" under the
UCCC. Small loan companies would not qualify, as they do not receive deposits,
and thus would require special licensing under § 3.503 in order to make loans at
"supervised" loan rates.
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less, 21% per year on unpaid balances between $o and $1,ooo, and
15% per year on balances over $i,ooo, or (2) 18% per year.9 2
For regular consumer loans, that is, those not "supervised," the
Code would provide a single rate ceiling of 18% per annum, applicable
alike to single payment and installment loans and to loans pursuant to
open end accounts.93
In the area of consumer credit sales (as distinguished from loans),
the maximum periodic charge on open end (revolving) accounts would
be % on balances of $5oo or less, and ii,% on balances in excess of
$500.94 For other credit sales, such as those under installment con-
tracts, the Code would prescribe rate ceilings identical to those for
"supervised" loans, that is, (1) 36% per year on the first $oo balance,
plus 21% per year on balances between $3oo and $i,ooo, plus 15%
per year on balances over $i,ooo, or (2) 18% per year, whichever is
greater.9 5
The significance of the Code in this regard is not so much the ac-
tual rates prescribed for credit sales, but rather that the Code would
for the first time subject installment credit sales in Virginia to credit
charge ceilings. Under the "time price doctrine", as developed by early
2UCCC § 3.5o8. Compare these ceilings with the small loan company rates
under present Virginia law. Text accompanying note 70 supra. These ceilings would
be authorized for single payment and installment "supervised" loans as well as
for open end credit plans operated by "supervised financial organizations" (bank
credit cards). But it has been suggested that in order for an open end plan to be
accorded the 36-21-15 rates under § 3.508, the periodic finance charge would have
to be imposed on the average daily balances in the period, presumably because
otherwise the charge would not be consistent with the actuarial method as required.
Braucher, supra note 8, at 320. Where the charge is imposed on a balance as of
a particular date during the period, as is often the case, the maximum rate would
be s8%, with a minimum charge of 50 cents. UCCC § 3.201(4); note 93 infra and
accompanying text.
9UCCC § 3.201. The same ceiling applies to "consumer related" loans. UCCC
§ 3.602; text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
Virginia law also authorizes an annual charge of 18% on open end plans (both
lender and retail plans). Note 54 supra and accompanying text. It does not sanction
a minimum periodic charge as does the UCCC (5o cents). UCCC § 3.2o1(4) (c).
"UCCC § 2.207. This section authorizes a minimum periodic finance charge of
50 cents. Note 93 supra.
wUCCC § 2.2o. A minimum finance charge of $5.00 would be authorized where
the amount financed, as defined by § 2.111, does not exceed $75.00, as would a
minimum charge of $7.50 where the amount financed exceeds $75.00. UCCC §
2.2o(6).
"Consumer related" sales (text accompanying notes 14-16 supra) would be sub-
ject to the 21/% ceiling on open end accounts, and a single 18% ceiling on other
credit sales. UCCC § 2.6o2,
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Virginia case law,06 a credit sale has been considered technically
neither a loan nor a forbearance of money, and thus not subject to the
usury statutes. The UCCC would thus eliminate the "time price doct-
rine" in Virginia and provide an over-all regulation of rates for both
sale and loan consumer credit.
A principal concern expressed by some critics is that the UCCG rate
ceilings are too high, the fear being that creditors will charge the high-
est permissible rates.0 7 While this would be a possibility, it is the con-
sidered belief of the advising economists and the lawyers who drafted
the Code that the natural forces of competition will generally produce
levels of rates below the ceilings.9 8 In time, perhaps studies of the effects
of the UCCC in Oklahoma and Utah will provide the best test of these
predictions, but for the moment Virginia's experience with finance
charge rates in installment credit sales and first deed of trust loans,
where the sky is the limit in both cases,0 9 does indicate that competition
alone can be effective in keeping finance charge rates within reason.
In addition, the UCCC reflects the recognition that low ceilings tend
to limit the availability of legal credit only to those with the better
credit standing, forcing the marginal or poorer credit risks to the il-
legal lenders. 00 The need for higher rates -is also directly related to
the increase in consumers' rights the Code would provide, as these
charges would necessarily bear on the costs in extending credit.' 01
OSee, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Lunsford, 209 Va. 743, 748, 167 S.E.2d
414, 418-19 (1969) (dictum); Evans v. Rice, 96 Va. 50, 30 S.E. 463 (1898); Myers v.
Williams, 85 Va. 621, 8 S.E. 483 (1889); Graeme v. Adams, 64 Va. 457, 23 Gratt. 225
(1873); Kraker v. Shields, 6i Va. 471, 2o Gratt. 377 (1871); Greenhov's Adm'x v.
Harris, 2o Va. 812, 6 Munf. 472 (182o); West v. Belches, 19 Va. 393, 5 Munf. 187
(1816).
"Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAw. 511, 512 (1970); A Consumer Credit Code... for Lenders, 34 CONSUMER
REP. 122 (1969). But see Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's
View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 496-97 (1969) (suggesting that the UCCC ceilings
are not high enough on loans of $300 or less).
sBraucher, supra note 8, at 323-25; Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on
Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REv. 8i, 113-14 (1967); Malcolm, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. LAw. 937, 946-47 (1970); Moo, Consumerism
and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957, 96o-6I (197O).
",Text accompanying notes 76 and 96 supra.
wr'he small loan laws, which prescribe relatively high rates, were designed to
provide the high risk debtor with an alternative to the loan shark. Braucher,
supra note 8, at 324; see B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 16
(1965); VIRGINIA ADvIsORY LEGISLATrVE COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA SMALL
LOAN Acr, S. Doc. No. 12, at 8 (1967).
'01UCCC § 2.201, Comment 3; Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on
Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MiCm. L. REv. 8j, io8 (1967).
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These thoughts are expressed in the Prefatory Note to the UCCC as
follows:
[A] combination of too low ceiling rates, too substantial restric-
tions on creditors' rights and remedies, or too great enhance-
ments of debtors' rights and remedies, might deprive the less
credit-worthy of lawful sources of credit and drive them to 'loan
sharks' and other illegal credit grantors in whose hands they
will enjoy no legal protection .... 102
Furthermore, in comparing existing Virginia statutory rates to the
UCCC, it must be recognized that the UCCC ceilings speak in terms of
the actuarial method of computation, not add-on or discount,103 and
contemplate all of the charges incident to the extension of credit,
1 04
thus encompassing many of the special charges that are now authorized
by Virginia law as in addition to the statutory interest rates. According-
ly, what may at first appear to be a substantial increase by the UCCC
over existing Virginia rates, is in fact not a great difference.105
LICENSING
The UCCC rate structure is necessarily linked to the Code policy on
licensing of creditors. As previously stated, it is expected that competi-
tion among suppliers of credit would force finance charge rates to
levels below the UCCC ceilings. 06 In order to foster such competition,
the UCCC seeks to encourage easier entry into the credit extending
field by liberalizing existing state licensing requirements. This concept
of "free entry" has been explained by the drafters of the Code as
follows:
This section [on licensing] is intimately related to disclosure
**. and to maximum charges .... The purpose is to facilitate
entry into the cash loan field so that the resultant rate competi-
tion fostered by disclosure will generally force rates below the
permitted maximum charges .... 107
2UCCC Prefatory Note in CCH, NEw RULES oN CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTON
267-68 (1969).
1wNote 51 and text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra.
'"Text accompanying note 86 supra.
a0Tro illustrate, a bank installment loan of $i,ooo would be subject to an 18%
ceiling under the UCCC. Under present Virginia law, the bank may charge 6%
add-on for such a loan. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320 (Repl. Vol. 1966). Assuming a 24
month loan, this would be about 11.25% effective annual interest by the actuarial
method. In addition, the bank would be authorized to charge an "investigation fee"
of 2% of the amount of the loan. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-321 (RepI. Vol. 1966). Thus,
rather than a 6% rate to compare to the UCCC ceiling of 18%, Virginia law now
authorizes a charge of at least 13.25% on such a loan.
'Text accompanying note 98 supra.
17UCCC § 3.503, Comment 1.
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A secondary purpose is to reduce the likelihood of establishing
localized monopolies in the granting of cash credit. Such mono-
polies tend to push rates charged to the maximum permitted
levels and to establish conditions under which some share of the
anticipated monopoly profits are devoted to direct or indirect
pressures to obtain the license.108
To be specific, only those creditors engaged in the business of ex-
tending "supervised" loans-loans at rates in excess of 18% per year-
would be licensed under the UCCC.1 9 Accordingly, there would be no
UCCC licensing of persons making consumer credit sales, leases, and
non-"supervised" loans. All creditors would be required, however, to
file annual information notices with the UCCC Administrator, 110 and to
pay annual notification fees."'
In addition, the UCCC Administrator would be required to issue
licenses to applicants solely on the basis of their financial responsibility
and the character and fitness of their officers and directors." 2 There
would be no standard restricting licensing only to those applicants who
meet minimum capital requirements and can show that the convenience
and advantage of the public would be served (that is, that there is a
need in the community for the applicant's office). Under existing Vir-
ginia law, banks,"13 savings and loan associations,"14 industrial loan asso-
ciations," 5, and small loan companies"O are subject to convenience and
advantage tests."17 But the Code would free only small loan companies
from this standard, as "supervised financial organizations", which in-
dude all regulated lenders authorized to receive deposits such as
banks, savings and loan associations and industrial loan associations,"18
tmUCCC § 3.503, Comment 2.
a0See UCCC § 3.502. Furthermore, not all makers of "supervised" loans would
be required to obtain UCCC licenses, as "supervised financial organizations" (note
91 supra and accompanying text) would continue to be subject only to the
licensing requirements of existing state law. UCCC § 3.502, Comment 1; text
accompanying notes 118 and 19 infra.
mUCCC § 6.202.
IUUCCC § 6.203. These fees would be at the rate of $io for each $Soo,ooo
of unpaid balances owed the creditor for more than thirty days during the pre-
ceding calendar year.
"'UCCC § 3.503; see UCCC § 2.201, Comment 1(3).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-170 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"W5VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-228, -13 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
'"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-256 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"'Credit unions and insurance premium finance companies are the only
regulated lenders not now subject to a convenience and advantage test. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-197 (Repl. Vol. 1966) (credit unions); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-737
(Repl. Vol. 1970) (insurance premium finance companies).
mNote 91 supra and accompanying text.
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would continue to be subject to existing minimum capital require-
ments and standards of convenience and advanthge for the establish-
ment of offices and branches." 9
As a technical matter, the Code would permit such traditional non-
lenders as retailers to enter the cash loan field, banks to extend high
risk consumer loans at special small loan rates, and consumer finance
companies to establish branches without limitation.120 Considerable
concern has been expressed that these new freedoms would be to the
competitive disadvantage of institutions such as banks which would re-
main subject to restrictive licensing.' 21 Early reports from Utah, where
the UCCC concept of "free entry" is now in effect, indicate, however,
that there has been no great rush into the lending field by non-lending
businesses, and no major shifts of consumer credit away from the tradi-
tional sources of credit or from one such source to another. 22 This is
not surprising, as there will be a natural tendency for creditors, be-
cause of economies of operation, to limit their activities to fields of
their special expertise. Such a result is not necessarily contrary to the
objectives of the UCCC, for as one proponent of the Code has observed:
While it is to be hoped that artificial market segmentation will
be broken down, we should not anticipate that there will be less
market specialization . . . The important point is that such
specialization will be produced by economic forces and not by
victories won or lost in the halls of the state legislature. 23
'"See UCCC § 3.502, Comment I; UCCC § 3.5o3, Comment 3. It has been
suggested that such institutions must remain subject to these standards for the
protection of depositors. Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's
View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 516 (1969).
"'Shay, supra note 119, at 511.
"'American Bankers Association, An Analysis of the Economic Effects of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code 1-3 (Nov. 1968); see generally Harper, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus. LAw. 227 (1968). It has been
suggested, however, 'that since banks enjoy more than 43% of the consumer credit
market, they have little standing to complain of the threat from competition.
Braucher, supra note 8, at 326.
L-Address by Robert N. Winston, Vice President of American Finance Manage-
ment Corporation, to the Joint Kansas-Nebraska Association, June 17, 1970. A
letter from William C. Wideman, Deputy Adm'r, Consumer Credit Bureau of the
State of Utah to the Division of Statutory Research and Drafting of the Common-
wealth of Virginia indicates that there has been no rush for supervised lender licenses
in Utah. Copies of both the address and the letter are on file in the Washington
and Lee Law School Library.
"-Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23
J. FINANCE 303, 308 (1968).
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CONSUMER PROTEcTIONS
Included in the UCCC are a number of important provisions de-
signed generally to strengthen consumers' rights, and to eliminate cer-
tain credit practices commonly found to be unfair to debtors. Many of
these provisions would be new to Virginia law, whereas others would
produce little change. The following discussion will compare the
UCCC and Virginia law on several of these consumer protection issues.
Waiver of Defenses
A subject of particular interest in the area of consumer rights is the
practice of certain creditors (generally sellers of consumer goods) of
assigning their credit contracts with consumers to another party, such
as a bank or consumer finance company. In certain situations, such as
where the credit contract is a negotiable instrument or where the
contract specifically authorizes the assignment with a waiver of the
consumer's defenses, the assignee takes the contract free of most claims
and defenses the consumer might have against the original creditor.
Such assignments are a vital part of the retail industry, as they provide
an essential means for financing a retailer's business. But the practice
can lead to oppressive results, particularly where the consumer who
has been sold defective merchandise has no practical means of recourse
against a disappearing seller, but remains liable on the contract in the
hands of the assignee.
Such assignments and waivers of defenses are authorized by existing
Virginia law, as the Virginia Uniform Commercial Code provides that
if an assignee of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course, 2 4
he takes the instrument free from all claims and defenses of the debtor
on the instrument except the defenses of infancy, incapacity, duress,
illegality, fraud in the factum and insolvency. 2 5 Virginia law further
sanctions specific waiver of defense clauses in contracts, thus providing
for the same result on instruments which are not negotiable. 126
The UCCC approach to this problem provides, first of all, that in a
consumer sale or lease, other than one for an agricultural purpose, the
seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument, other than a check,
as evidence of the consumer's obligation. 27 Further, the Code provides
"M'A holder in due course is defined as any party who takes the instrument for
value, in good faith, and without notice that is overdue, has been dishonored or
of any defense against it. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-302 (Added Vol. 1965).
'-VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-305 (Added Vol. 1965).
LmVA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-206 (Added Vol. 1965). This statute is by its terms
subject to any different rule for purchases of consumer goods, but there have been
no reported Virginia decisions establishing a different rule for consumer goods.
12'UCCC § 2.403.
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that an assignee of a consumer negotiable instrument will not be con-
sidered a holder in due course if he knew the instrument was written
in violation of the Code. With adoption of the UCCG, then, the finan-
cial community will know that a negotiable instrument taken on a sale
or lease is in violation of the Code, and thus no assignee bank or fi-
nance company could claim holder in due course status.
128
On the subject of specific waiver clauses in credit contracts, the
UCCC offers the legislatures alternative provisions. The first alterna-
tive would subject an assignee of a consumer sale or lease contract to
all of the claims and defenses of the consumer against the original
creditor. 29 The second alternative would permit a limited waiver clause
that would be effective only if the assignee gives the debtor notice of
the assignment, and only with respect to claims or defenses which arise,
but are not asserted, before the end of a three month period after the
notice is mailed. 30 In addition, the waiver would be effective only if
the assignee is not "related" to the seller or lessor, acquired the contract
in good faith and for value, and had no knowledge of substantial com-
plaints by others that the assignor fails to perform contracts or remedy
defaults. Under either alternative, the debtor's claims and defenses
could be raised only as a defense or set-off against an action by the as-
signee, and the assignee's liability on such claims would be limited to
the amount then owing him on the contract.
In suggesting these alternatives, the UCCC thus encourages each
state legislature to assess carefully the extent to which waiver of de-
fense clauses are a problem in its particular state, and the effect an
absolute prohibition of such practices would have on the normal
sources of inventory financing. 31
Balloon Payments
The last installment on a credit sale or loan contract is sometimes in
an amount larger than any of the previous installments. Such an in-
'UCCC 2.403, Comment.
'-'UCCc § 2.404 [Alt. A].
'UCCC § 2404 [Alt. B].
mSee Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957, 967-68 (1970), sug-
gesting that an absolute prohibition might restrict the availability of funds to small
independent retailers. Indeed, it has been argued that as the usual assignee's sole
function is that of a financier who has no relation at all to the product sold or the
transaction of sale, the assignee should not be responsible for the seller's defaults.
Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions,
8 B.C. IND. & Cohma. L. REv. 585, 552 (1967); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation:
A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 471 (1968). On the other
hand, the assignee, because of its economic leverage over the seller, may be in a
better position than the individual consumer to police the practice of the seller.
68 CoLum. L. RaV. at 472.
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stallment may be necessary where the amount of each regular payment is
insufficient to pay off the debt over the term of the obligation, and is
in the nature of a "catch up" payment. Regardless of its function, how-
ever, a larger installment can come as a shock to a debtor who has be-
come accustomed to the lower payments. For this reason, the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation Z requires the creditor to disclose the
amount of each installment to the debtor and to term any payment
which would be more than twice the amount of another installment a
"balloon payment". 3 2 With this information in hand, at least the
debtor will be on notice as to the larger installment before he becomes
obligated on the debt.
The UCCC goes beyond the federal law by requiring the creditor to
permit the debtor to refinance any installment which is twice the aver-
age amount of the other installments, without penalty. 33 There is no
comparable requirement in existing Virginia law. 3 4
The Code further requires that on loans of $1,ooo, or less, if the
finance charge is in excess of io% per year, all installments must be




As a basic matter, the UCCO limits the security interest of a con-
sumer credit seller to the actual goods sold. Where the debt is $3oo or
more, the seller may also take a security interest in goods he services or
in goods upon which goods sold are installed or annexed. The seller is
authorized to take a security interest in land, but only if the debt is
$i,ooo or more, and if the goods sold are affixed to the land, or if the
land is maintained, repaired or improved as a result of the sale of goods
or services.'3 7 Excepted from these restrictions are sales for agricultural
mReg. Z § 226.8(b)(3).
"UCCC §§ 2405, 3.402. This requirement does not apply in the case of sales
or loans for agricultural purposes or those pursuant to open end accounts. An
exception is also provided where the payment schedule accounts for the seasonal
or irregular income of the debtor.
234Like Regulation Z, the regulations under the Virginia Consumer Credit Code
require the disclosure of balloon payments. S.C.C. Reg. 8 (b) (3).
=UCCC § 3.5 1. Such loans are also limited to terms of no more than 37 months
where the principal is in excess of $3oo, and 25 months where the principal is $3oo
or less.
m6VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-285 (Supp. 1970). Loans subject to this Act are limited to
maximum terms of 31 months when the principal is more than $6oo, and 21 months
where the principal is $6oo or less.
'17UCCC § 2.407(1). On a consumer lease, the lessor is prohibited from taking a
security interest in any of the lessee's property. UCCC § 2.4o7(2).
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purposes, where the credit seller is free to take a security in any of the
debtor's property.138 By contrast, there are no limitations in Virginia
law as to collateral on consumer credit sales and leases.
With respect to consumer loans, the UCCC forbids lenders to take
security interests in real estate if the principal of the loan is $1,ooo or
less. 139 This restriction has application, however, only to "supervised"
loans (finance charges in excess of 18%). A similar restriction is found
in the Virginia Small Loan Act.
140
Wage Assignments
An assignment of the debtor's wages is sometimes required by the
creditor as security on a credit obligation. Such assignments of wages
are valid in Virginia provided they are made in strict compliance with
the statutory form and procedure,' 4' and then only to the extent the
wages exceed the statutory garnishment exemptions.142 The UCCC, on




Occasionally, a consumer loan or credit sale contract will contain
a provision whereby the debtor authorizes a named person (usually an
agent of the creditor) to enter (confess) judgment against him if he
should default on the obligation. Where the debtor agrees to such a
provision, the creditor may be able to obtain judgment on default with-
out first having a hearing on the debt.
Confessions of judgment are authorized under Virginia law, 44 al-
though the debtor is allowed a hearing on the matter if he raises timely
defenses after the judgment is docketed. 145 But the UCCC policy is to
provide the consumer a right to hearing before judgment, and thus
the Code prohibits all confession of judgment clauses in credit contracts
and notes and renders them void. 46
a-This exception is apparently provided because of an established practice in
agricultural sales. See UCCC § 2.407, Comment 5.
UCCC § 3.510(1).
u0VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-281 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-31 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Repl. Vol. 197o). Where the loan is subject to the
Small Loan Act, an assignment of wages is limited to the lesser of io% of the
wages or -the excess over the garnishment exemption. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-288
(Supp. 1970), -289 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
"'UCCC §§ 2410, 3.403. The concern here is the need for a steady family income.
UCCC § 2.410, Comment. A debtor may authorize deductions from his salary, how-
ever, but only if the authorization is revocable. UCCC § 2.410, Comment.
""VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-356, -359 (Rep1. Vol. 1957).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 8-357 (Supp. 1970).
1"UCCC §§ 2 .415, 3.407.
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Deficiency Judgments
Where a credit obligation is secured by collateral, the question arises
as to whether a creditor who repossesses the collateral on default but is
unable to dispose of the property for the full value of the debt may sue
the debtor for the deficiency. Under the Virginia Uniform Commercial
Code, both repossession of the collateral and suit for deficiency judg-
ment are authorized unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 147
The UCCC departs from the Uniform Commercial Code in this
regard by limiting a seller of consumer goods and services, where the
cash price is $i,ooo or less, to an election of remedies-repossession or
suit for judgment-but not both.148 In addition, if the seller elects to sue
for the debt, rather than repossess, the Code provides that thereafter
the goods sold will not be subject to levy on execution of the judg-
ment.149
Existing Virginia law on deficiency judgments would be unchanged
as to credit sales of more than $i,ooo. The drafters of the Code have
thus made a policy distinction based on the value of the merchandise.
Where the original cash price is relatively small-under $i,ooo-the re-
possessed merchandise (clothing, household goods) is likely of little or
no resale value, and thus repossession may serve no real purpose other
than harassment of the debtor. On the higher priced items, there seems
to be greater equity in favor of the creditor who disposes of the repos-
sessed merchandise, such as an automobile subject to a year's deprecia-
tion, but is left with a sizeable unpaid balance owing him.1 50
Attorney's Fees
The UCCC contains specific limitations on agreements that the
debtor will be responsible for the creditor's attorneys' fees in the event
collection proceedings are necessary. In the case of "supervised" loans
of $i,ooo or less, the Code prohibits any agreements as to attorneys'
1'7VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8.9-502(2), -504(2) (Added Vol. 1965). Where the transaction
is a sale of accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, however, deficiency judgments
are allowed only if authorized by the security agreement between the parties. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.9-502(2). The Virginia courts have also awarded deficiency judgments
after foreclosure on real estate mortgages. Woodhouse v. Harrison, 168 Va. 574,
191 S.E. 776 (1937); see Snead, Retail Installment Sales: Virginia Remedies on Default,
16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 19 n.81 (1959).
'"UCCC § 5.1o3. For the most part, the provisions of the UCC supplement the
UCCC. Where the two Acts conflict, the UCCC would control. UCCG § i.io3 and
Comment.
,,,UCCC § 5 .io3(6)(b).
1W0Cf. Moo, Consumerism and the UCCC, 25 Bus. LAw. 957, 968-69 (197o); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24 , 1968, § 3, at 16, col. 6.
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fees. 151 With respect to other consumer loans and sales, the Code offers
alternative provisions: either an absolute prohibition of such agree-
ments, 1 52 as with "supervised loans", or a limitation of the debtors' re-
sponsibility for attorneys' fees to 15% of the unpaid debt.153
Such restrictions on agreements for attorneys' fees reflect the policy
of treating these expenses, at least to some extent, as part of the cred-
itor's cost of doing business, which may be taken into account in deter-
mining the finance charge rate to be applied on a particular transac-
tion.154
There are no similar limitations expressed in the existing Virginia
statutes, 55 and the more recent Virginia decisions have held agree-
ments obligating the debtor for attorneys' fees proper, if the fees
charged are reasonable.156
Prepayment and Rebate of Unearned Finance Charge
The UCCC specifically authorizes the prepayment in full before
maturity of a consumer credit sale or loan, without penalty. 5 7 Where
such prepayment is made, the creditor is required to rebate to the debt-
or any portion of the paid finance charges which were unearned on the
obligation as of the date of prepayment, calculated in accordance with
the Rule of 78.158
There is considerable variance in the Virginia statutes as to when
and under what conditions prepayment is authorized. To illustrate, the
5UCCC § 3.514.
''UC(CC §§ 2413 [Alt. A], 3404 [Alt. A].
rIUCCC § 2.413 [Alt. B], 3404 [Alt. B].
'"See UCCC § 2.413 [Alt. A], Comment and [Alt. B], Comment.
uThe Virginia Small Loan Act prohibits the collection on loans subject to that
Act of any charges in addition to the authorized interest. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.x-278
(Repl. Vol. 1966). This statute could be construed as preventing the charging of
collection costs and attorneys' fees to the debtor.
"'Parksley Nat'l Bank v. Accomac Banking Co., 166 Va. 459, i86 S.E. 38 (1936);
Conway v. American Nat'l Bank, 146 Va. 357, 131 S.E. 803 (1926); Colley v. Summers
Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S.E. 9o6 (1916). Earlier cases had held such
agreements void as imposing illegal penalties. Fields v. Fields, 1o5 Va. 714, 54 S.E.
888 (1906); Rixey v. Pearre Bros. & Co., 89 Va. 1x3, 15 S.E. 498 (1892). The holding
in both the Fields and Rixey cases was overruled by the court in Colley. 119 Va.
'at 445, 89 S.E. at 9o8.
'UCCC §§ 2.2o9, 3.309. This privilege does not apply to a sale or loan involving
real estate where the finance charge is less than 1o% per year, as such a transaction
is not a consumer credit sale or loan as defined by the UCCC. In addition, partial
prepayment is not an absolute privilege and may be made only if allowed by the
creditor. UCCC § 2.2o9, Comment; UCCC § 3.2o9, Comment.
I sUCCC §§ 2.210, 3.2 10. On installment loans and sales, the creditor is permitted
to retain a minimum finance charge of $5.oo, where the amount financed was $75.00
or less, or $7.50, where it exceeded $75.00. The Rule of 78 is explained in paragraph
(3) of UCCC §§ 2.21o and 3.210.
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following table lists those situations in which the privilege of prepay-
ment is required by statute, together with any authorized penalties or
prescribed rebates:
Type of Loan
or Creditor Penalty Rebate
Savings Sc Loan Associations'1 9  2% None
Credit Unions' 60  None None
First mortgage loans of 1% None
$75,000 or less' 61
Industrial loan associations'6 2  None Rule of 78, less
charge on next 6
installments
Small loan companies' 63  None Yes, but no pre-
scribed method
Second mortgage loans164  None Rule of 78
Insurance premium finance None Yes, but no pre-
companies0 5  scribed method' 66
The UCCC would thus provide needed uniformity in Virginia as
to prepayment and rebate of unearned finance charges.
Referral Sales
A form of sales practice that has been a subject of considerable at-
tention in Virginia in recent months is the referral sale or "pyramid
promotional scheme". This is the practice whereby a customer is in-
duced to enter into a contract for the purchase of goods or services on
the promise that he will receive a rebate or discount for every additional
customer he refers to the seller. In practice, as the scheme expands, the
customer receives little rebate or discount, if any. The UCCC not only
prohibits such practices, but authorizes a consumer who has been sold
goods or services in such a scheme to keep the merchandise or the bene-
fit of the services without obligation to pay for them.167
'5VA. CODE ANN. § 6.i-16 (Repl. Vol. 1966).
°VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-217 (Supp. 1970).
InVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319.1 (Supp. 1970).
'OVA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-234 (Supp. 1970).
2
0 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-271(2)(a) (Supp. 1970).
'"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-33o(a) (Supp. 1970).
"W1VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-740 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
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Responding to a recent spread of such schemes in Virginia, the 1970
General Assembly outlawed these practices as misdemeanors, and ren-
dered any contracts written in pyramid or referral plans unenforce-
able.168 Although the UCCC and the Virginia statute are written in
different terms, they seem to have a similar purpose and effect.
Home Solicitation Sales
Another sales practice that has been the subject of considerable
consumer complaint is the purchase solicited at the buyer's residence.
Because of a belief that such sales often involve high pressure tactics
that are not present to the same degree in sales transacted in a store,
the UCCC provides the consumer a right to cancel any credit sale con-
tract personally solicited and consummated in his residence, provided
the right is exercised by midnight of the third business day following
the date the contract was signed.L6 9 The Code also requires the cred-
itor to explain to the consumer his right to cancel, using a prescribed
form of disclosure.
170
There is an almost identical measure in existing Virginia law,
known as the Virginia Home Solicitation Sales Act.17' The two laws
differ, however, in that the Virginia statute exempts from coverage
home sales by a seller owning a retail merchant's license and having an
established place of business in Virginia (which may be the seller's
dwelling house) within 75 miles of the buyer's residence. 172
Garnishment Exemptions
With the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, Congress has
moved into the area of creditors' remedies by prescribing certain exemp-
tions from garnishment. 73 Under this law, which became effective July
'-"VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-67.1, -67.2 (Supp. 197o). This statute was recently used
to enjoin a pyramid scheme promoting the sale of motivational courses. Richmond
Times Dispatch, Oct. 16, 197o, at A-i , col. 2.
"'UCCO § 2.502; see UCCC § 2.5o, Comment i. This right is an extension of
the three day right of rescission provided by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act for consumer credit transactions involving residential real estate. Text ac-
companying notes 34 and 36 supra. The Federal Trade Commission has proposed a
similar rule for door-to-door sales of $1o or more. 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE
10,451 (Feb. 4, 1971) (if the right is exercised by five o'clock P.M. of the third
business day following the date the contract is signed).
x'OUCCC § 2.503.
27'VA. CODE ANN. 8H 59.1-21.1 to -21.6 (Supp. 1976); note 35 supra.
'-"VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.2 (Supp. 197o). This exception would seem to render
the statute practically ineffective, as even the fly-by-night operator could maintain
that his hotel room is his dwelling house. See discussion in Goolsby, Commercial
Law, Annual Suruey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1391-92 (1970).
'--Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title III, 82 Stat. 162 §§ 301-07 (codified as
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-77 (Supp. 1970)) [hereinafter cited as CCPA Title I1].
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
1, 197o, a judgment creditor may garnish only the lesser of (i) 25% of
the debtor's disposable weekly earnings, or (ii) the amount by which
his disposable weekly earnings exceed 3o times a prescribed federal
minimum hourly wage (presently $1.6o) .174 A debtor is thus insured of
at least $48.oo per week free from garnishment process. In order to
conform the Virginia law to the Federal Act, the 197o General As-
sembly amended the State garnishment statute to provide identical
exemptions.1
75
The UCCC differs from the federal and Virginia laws slightly by
providing a minimum exemption of 40 (not 3o) times the federal
minimum hourly wage.17 6 Accordingly, the UCCC would protect a
minimum of $64.00 of a debtor's weekly wages from garnishment.
Discharge from Employment
Aside from its value as a debt collection tool, garnishment may un-
fortunately result in the firing of an employee from his job by an em-
ployer who is being bothered with garnishment papers. In order to
limit this result, the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act pro-
hibits the discharge of an employee because of garnishment for any
one indebtedness. 177 A similar prohibition against discharges has been
added to the Virginia statutes.178
The UCCC goes beyond the federal and Virginia statutes by pro-
hibiting employment discharges by reason of any number of garnish-
ments, and regardless of the number of debts.17 9 That is, whereas
neither the federal nor Virginia laws would deny an employer the right
to fire an employee because of garnishments on multiple debts, the
UCCC would. In addition, the Code would authorize an employee
discharged in violation of the statute to bring an action to recover up to
six weeks lost wages and an order reinstating him to his job.8s
174CCPA Title III § 303, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (Supp. 1970).
275VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Repl. Vol. 1970). The Virginia law extends these
exemptions to wage assignments, whereas the Federal Act does not. See text ac-
companying notes 141 and 142 supfra.
27UJCCC § 5.o5. The UCC Comment explains that the extra exemption was
thought justified in consumer transactions. The exemption does not expressly apply
to wage assignments, 'however. See note 175 and -text accompanying notes 141 and
142 supra.
'1CCPA Title III § 304, 15 US.CA. § 1674 (Supp. i97o). Violation of this
statute is a crime subject to a fine of $iooo or one year imprisonment, or both.
i9nVA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Repl. Vol. 197o). The Virginia statute does not




1oo WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, in its pure form, would pro-
duce bold changes from traditional concepts of credit regulation in
Virginia, particularly in the areas of rate ceilings and licensing. For this
reason, considerable controversy concerning the Code can be antid-
pated. It should be apparent from the preceding discussion, however,
that the present Virginia laws on consumer credit are in serious need
of modernization and clarification. To a degree, the Virginia legisla-
ture has taken strides in this direction with, for example, the Virginia
Consumer Credit Code,' 8 ' the statute prohibiting pyramid promo-
tions, 82 and the Home Solicitation Sales Act. 83 But at best these steps
represent piecemeal reform, only a partial response to the growing
complexity of consumer credit problems. The UCCC, on the other
hand, offers Virginia an opportunity to approach the entire subject of
consumer credit with a single, comprehensive code of law that attempts
to balance the legitimate interests of consumers and -the credit industry
alike. Whether the UCCC provides a proper balance is of course open
to debate, but as the Code reflects a great amount of responsible study
of the subject, it is worthy of serious and fair consideration for Virginia.
ADDENDUM
Wyoming adopted the UCCC on February 28, 1971, to go into effect
on May 21, 1971.184 The Indiana legislature has enacted a bill to adopt
the Code which, when signed by the Governor, will go into effect on
October 1, 1971.185
'$'Text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
2' Text accompanying note 168 supra.
8' Text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
'Information obtained from the Wyoming State Library.
23 CCH CONSUMER CSEIT GumE, Latest Report Letter No. 59, at i,5 (Mar.
4, 1971).
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